FIA Standing Order 02/2026: An “Alternate Remedy” That Shields the Agency, Not the Traveller

On 1 June 2026 the Director General of the Federal Investigation Agency issued Standing Order No. 02/2026. It was presented as a reform: a passenger who is offloaded at a Pakistani airport can now file a review and then an appeal inside the FIA. On paper, that sounds like progress.

In practice, and in this author’s view, the Standing Order does something quite different. It gives a legal-looking cover to a power that no statute confers, and it hands the FIA a ready answer whenever an offloaded citizen goes to the High Court: “an alternate remedy is available.” This article explains why that answer does not survive legal scrutiny.

What Standing Order 02/2026 provides

The full text has not been widely published. From the FIA’s own public notices and press reports, the mechanism is as follows:

• Review: the offloaded passenger may apply within 7 days to the Incharge Immigration or the Deputy/Additional Director at the airport concerned, who is to decide within 3 days. A Lahore High Court order of September 2026 refers to this three-day limit as clause 13(a)(ii) of the Standing Order.
• Appeal: if dissatisfied, the passenger may appeal to a Zonal Grievance Committee, which is to decide within 10 days.
• Composition: the Committee is made up of FIA officers. In the Peshawar Zone, for example, it is chaired by the Zonal Director with two Deputy Directors as members.
• Scope: the Committee examines whether the offloading was based on a “documented, approved risk indicator”.
• Hearing: the Committee may decide on the written appeal and the record if the passenger does not appear.

1. A remedy cannot create the power it reviews

The first question is not whether the review mechanism is good or bad. It is whether the FIA has any lawful power to offload a passenger who holds a valid passport, visa and ticket and whose name is on no stop list.

The courts have repeatedly asked the FIA to show that power, and the FIA has struggled to do so. In December 2025 the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, recorded in the case of Shehryar Qandeel that no provision of law authorising such stoppage could be pointed out. In May 2026, in Muhammad Abbas v. Federation of Pakistan, the Lahore High Court held that travel cannot be stopped on suspicion and without recorded reasons. In September 2026 the Islamabad High Court was reported to have told the agency plainly that an SOP is not a law, and directed it to produce the statutory provisions under which passengers are offloaded.

The most detailed treatment so far is the Islamabad High Court judgment of 6 August 2026 in Hasnain Jamal v. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. No. 1585 of 2026 and connected petitions, per Arbab Muhammad Tahir, J.). The petitioners held work visas and had been registered by the Protector of Emigrants, yet were offloaded without any written order. The Court drew a clear line between the power to regulate emigration, which the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 gives to the Protector of Emigrants, and the power to investigate offences, which is all that the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 gives to the FIA. On that basis it held that FIA immigration staff have no statutory authority to re-assess a cleared emigrant and offload him. The FIA had defended the practice as “risk assessment”. That is the same vocabulary on which the Standing Order is built.

Article 15 of the Constitution permits restrictions on freedom of movement only when they are “imposed by law”. Article 9 protects liberty “save in accordance with law”, and Article 4 guarantees that no action detrimental to a person shall be taken except in accordance with law. The Supreme Court applied these principles to travel restrictions in Federal Government of Pakistan v. Ayyan Ali (2017 SCMR 1179). A departmental standing order is not “law” in this sense. It is an internal instruction issued by the head of an agency to his own officers.

An appeal against an act presupposes that the act was within jurisdiction. By creating an appellate ladder, the Standing Order quietly assumes the very thing that is in dispute, namely that offloading on a “risk profile” is lawful in the first place.

2. Article 199 speaks of a remedy “provided by law”

Under Article 199(1) of the Constitution, the High Court may decline relief where there is another “adequate remedy provided by law”. Both parts of that phrase matter.

• “Provided by law”: the remedy must come from a statute or statutory rules. A review created by an executive standing order, which the same officer can amend or withdraw tomorrow, is not a remedy provided by law.
• “Adequate”: the remedy must be efficacious, speedy and capable of giving the relief the citizen actually needs.

The Supreme Court settled long ago, in Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan (PLD 1972 SC 279), that the rule about alternate remedy is a rule of convenience and discretion by which the court regulates its own proceedings. It is not a rule of law that takes away jurisdiction. The courts have consistently held that the rule does not apply where the impugned action is without lawful authority, is mala fide, or infringes fundamental rights.

An executive instruction cannot oust or postpone the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court. Only the Constitution can do that.

3. The FIA sits in appeal over the FIA

Under the Standing Order, the review goes to the immigration in-charge of the same airport, and the appeal goes to a committee of senior officers of the same agency. There is no independent member, no judicial officer, and no outside oversight.

This offends the oldest rule of natural justice: no one should be a judge in his own cause. It also sits uneasily with Article 10A of the Constitution, which guarantees a fair trial and due process in the determination of civil rights. A forum that may decide on the file, without hearing the citizen, and that is staffed by colleagues and superiors of the officer whose decision is under challenge, is a departmental check. It is not an adjudication.

4. The Committee asks the wrong question

According to published accounts, the Committee examines whether the offloading rested on a “documented, approved risk indicator”. That is a test of compliance with the FIA’s own internal profile. It is not a test of legality.

The passenger does not know what the “approved risk indicators” are, because they are not published. A citizen is therefore asked to argue an appeal against criteria he has never seen. Restrictions on a fundamental right must be known and accessible to the public. Unpublished profiling criteria raise serious concerns under Articles 4, 19A and 25 of the Constitution, and under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which requires public authorities to act reasonably, fairly and with reasons.

5. A remedy that arrives after the flight has gone

Even if every timeline in the Standing Order is honoured, the process takes up to 7 days to file, 3 days for review and 10 more days for appeal. By then:

• the flight has departed and the ticket is usually forfeited;
• the visa may have expired, or its single entry may be lost;
• the job offer, admission date, medical appointment or business meeting has passed.

Nothing in the reported scheme empowers the Committee to grant interim relief, to put the passenger on the next flight, to award compensation, or to proceed against the officer who acted unlawfully. A forum that cannot restore the right or repair the loss is not an “adequate” remedy. By comparison, a High Court can pass an interim order at the first hearing.

6. How the Standing Order is used in court

The practical effect is already visible. When an offloaded citizen files a constitutional petition, the standard reply of the agency is that the petitioner should first avail the remedy under the Standing Order. In at least one reported matter in September 2026, the petitioner was directed to appear before the FIA’s review committee while the petition was kept pending. In an earlier matter, a petition was treated as premature and sent to the Director General FIA as an application.

Two matters from this office show what happens next. Names are withheld to protect the clients.

• The three days that never ended. A family offloaded at Lahore airport in August 2026, while travelling to Dubai on valid visit visas, filed a writ petition. In September 2026 the petition was disposed of, without any finding on merits, with a direction to the Deputy Director FIA to decide their pending application by a reasoned, speaking order within three days, after hearing them, as the Standing Order itself requires. The three days passed. No hearing was held and no order was passed, and the family had to return to the High Court a second time.
• The review that repeated the mistake. A student with a confirmed university admission and a student visa was offloaded. On review, the Deputy Director upheld the offloading on a printed “Passenger Offloading Review Proforma” which described the traveller as holding a visit visa. The review repeated the original error instead of correcting it, and the student was left to file a further appeal before a committee of the same agency.

These are not isolated accidents. They are what one should expect when the officer who took the decision, or his immediate superior, is asked to review it on a printed form, and when the deadline that binds him is one the agency wrote for itself.

With respect, the more persuasive view is the one taken in those cases where the court asked the agency to first show its statutory power. If the power does not exist, there is nothing for a departmental committee to review, and the citizen should not be made to lose weeks proving that to the agency itself.

What should change

• If the State considers pre-departure screening necessary, Parliament should legislate, with defined grounds, time limits and safeguards.
• Any review forum should be created by statute and include an independent or judicial member.
• Risk indicators should be published, so that travellers know what is required of them.
• The forum should be able to grant same-day relief, order compensation and recommend action against the officer responsible.
• Until then, the Standing Order should be treated as what it is: an internal instruction that binds FIA officers, not a bar that binds citizens or courts.

Practical guidance if you have been offloaded

1. Ask for the offloading order or proforma with written reasons, as the Lahore High Court has directed.
2. File the review application under the Standing Order promptly, and keep proof of filing. It costs little and removes the “alternate remedy” objection.
3. Do not wait for the Committee if your travel is urgent. A constitutional petition under Article 199 can be filed at once, explaining why the departmental remedy is neither provided by law nor adequate.
4. File in the High Court that has territorial jurisdiction over the airport where you were offloaded.
5. Preserve evidence of your loss: ticket, visa, hotel booking and employer or university letters.

Need a lawyer for this? See our service page: FIA, Offloading & Travel Rights Lawyer. Related: What the LHC and IHC ruled on offloading in 2026.

Muhammad Shafique Baloch, Advocate High Court
Office No. 3, Basement, Miccop Centre, 1 Mozang Road, near AG Office Chowk / Lahore High Court, Lahore
WhatsApp / Phone: 0321-4960782

This article is legal commentary and expresses the author’s opinion on a matter of public importance. It is based on press reports and public notices available as of October 2026, since the full text of the Standing Order has not been officially published. Client details have been withheld. It is not legal advice for any particular case.